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THE DECISION OF X v THE SYDNEY CHILDREN’S HOSPITALS 
NETWORK [2013] NSWCA 320: MATURE MINORS AND THE REFUSAL 
OF BLOOD PRODUCTS  
This recent decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal considers the scope of the parens 
patriae jurisdiction in cases where the jurisdiction is invoked for the protection of a Gillick competent 
minor. As outlined below, in certain circumstances the law recognises that mature minors are able to 
make their own decisions concerning medical treatment. However, there have been a number of 
Commonwealth decisions which have addressed the issue of whether mature minors are able to refuse 
medical procedures in circumstances where refusal will result in the minor dying. Ultimately, this 
case confirms that the minor does not necessarily have a right to make autonomous decisions; the 
minor’s right to exercise his or her autonomous decision only exists when such decision accords with 
what is deemed to be in his or her best interests. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE BASIS OF APPEAL 
The appeal was made following a decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which gave the 
Sydney Children’s Hospital authority to administer blood and blood products to a mature minor 
(referred to as “the applicant”).1 The applicant was aged 17 years and eight months of age at the time 
of the appeal. He was previously diagnosed with Hodgkin’s disease, which is an aggressive cancer 
that stems from the body’s white blood cells. The disease affects the lymph nodes and weakens the 
ability of the immune system to fight infection. The applicant had undergone treatment for the 
disease, including chemo-radiotherapy, which had resulted in a three-month period of remission. 
However, he subsequently required further treatment once the disease returned. The applicant 
underwent a further round of chemotherapy, but this was not successful in completely eliminating his 
tumours. He therefore required high-doses of cytotoxic chemotherapy agents. Once these were 
administered, this further treatment caused anaemia to set in, which required either cessation of the 
treatment or a blood or platelet transfusion.  
 The applicant and his parents refused to consent to the provision of blood or blood products, 
based on their strongly held religious beliefs; the applicant and his parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
Despite these objections, the judge at first instance, Gzell J, agreed to make the orders that were 
sought by the Hospital which would allow them to administer blood. The applicant and his parents 
appealed based on a number of grounds. The main argument that was submitted to the court was 
based on the assertion that the parens patriae jurisdiction only operates in cases of incompetence, 
where the person who is the subject of the decision is unable to make a decision concerning his or her 
welfare. It was argued that in cases where a mature minor is competent to make their own decisions, 
consent is not required by the minor’s parents and that the court has no jurisdiction to override the 
minor’s decision (at [24]). The New South Wales Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
MATURE MINORS AND CONSENT  
Minors – that is, individuals who are younger than 182 – are presumed to lack the capacity that is 
needed to consent to medical treatment. However, the law recognises that “mature minors” can 
lawfully provide consent for such decisions. This concept has been referred to as Gillick competency 
after the landmark English decision of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
[1986] 1 AC 112, where the House of Lords held that a mature minor who is capable of 
understanding the nature and consequences of a particular type of medical treatment, can provide a 
legally effective consent to such treatment. 
 Although there is no direct judicial authority that has placed the Gillick principle firmly into 
Australian law, it was observed in Secretary Department of Health and Community Services v JWB 
(Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 that the Gillick principle is likely to apply in Australia. In New 
South Wales, there is legislation that provides that consent given by a mature minor will provide an 
effective defence to a doctor for any claim raised by the minor in assault or battery. Thus, s 49(2) of 
the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) provides that children over the age of 14 are 
                                                          
1 The Sydney Children’s Hospital Network v X [2013] NSWSC 368. 
2 Age of Majority Act 1974 (ACT), s 5; Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW), s 9; Age of Majority Act 1981 (NT), 
s 4; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 17; Age of Majority Act 1971 (SA), s 3; Age of Majority Act 1973 (Tas), s 3; Age of Majority 
Act 1977 (Vic), s 3; Age of Majority Act 1972 (WA), s 5. 
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able to consent to medical and dental treatment.
3
 Where no such legislative principle exists, either 
because the minor is below this age or the relevant jurisdiction does not have legislation addressing 
this issue, the Gillick principle applies. The law therefore allows minors to make their own decisions 
in circumstances where they are mature and capable of weighing up the factors of relevance to the 
decision in question. In the recent decision of X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network, the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal was required to consider the scope of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in 
cases where a minor is able to lawfully consent to his or her own treatment, based on these legal 
principles. 
THE SCOPE OF THE PARENS PATRIAE JURISDICTION 
The parens patriae jurisdiction is an ancient jurisdiction that was inherited from the English legal 
system. It originates from the Crown’s obligation to make decisions for those who are not able to care 
for themselves, such as minors or those of “unsound mind”.4 It has been described as a protective 
jurisdiction,
5
 and although the jurisdiction is historic it is nevertheless an important part of the 
Australian legal system.  
 The scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction has been described as unlimited and incapable of 
definition.
6
 However, as acknowledged by Beazley P in X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals 
Network, the jurisdiction should be invoked cautiously (at [2]). Beazley P referred to In re O’Hara 
[1900] 2 IR 232, where it was stated: 
 
the court must act cautiously, not as if it were a private person acting with regard to his own child, and 
acting in opposition to the parent only when judicially satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that the 
parental right should be suspended or superseded.7 
 
 Once the parens patriae jurisdiction is invoked, the guiding principle that underpins decision-
making in respect of the child is based on the welfare of the individual: “the Court’s ultimate 
determination must be based on what is best for the welfare of the person within its jurisdiction” (at 
[6]).  
 In the case, Basten JA considered a number of Commonwealth cases concerning minors who 
have sought to refuse life-saving medical treatment. He distinguished the case before him from other 
decisions involving parental rights over the welfare of the child compared to cases addressing the 
jurisdiction of the court (at [35]). He also relied upon the following passage from the English Court of 
Appeal in the decision of Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627 concerning the 
parens patriae jurisdiction: 
 
There is ample authority for the proposition that the inherent powers of the Court under its parens patriae 
jurisdiction are theoretically limitless and that they certainly extend beyond the powers of a natural parent 
…. There can therefore be no doubt that it has power to override the refusal of a minor, whether over the 
age of 16 or under that age but “Gillick competent”. It does not do so by ordering doctors to treat, which, 
even if within the Court’s powers, would be an abuse of them, by ordering the minor to accept treatment, 
but by authorising the doctors to treat the minor in accordance with their clinical judgment, subject to any 
restrictions which the Court may impose. 
 
 After examining a number of authorities concerning the refusal of medical treatment by minors, 
Basten JA held that the scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction is not affected in circumstances where 
the minor is deemed to be Gillick competent (at [45]): 
 
The very concept of a “mature minor” envisages a fact-finding exercise with respect to a specific young 
person. That exercise is itself, presumably, undertaken in the parens patriae jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
                                                          
3 It should also be noted that in South Australia, s 6 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
provides that a person over the age of 16 can provide consent to medical treatment. There are no such legislative provisions – 
to enable minors to make their own decisions concerning medical treatment – that exist in other Australian jurisdictions. 
4 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s case) (1991) 175 CLR 218 at 258-259 
(Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
5 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s case) (1991) 175 CLR 218 at 280 (Brennan 
J). 
6 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s case) (1991) 175 CLR 218 at 258 (Mason 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).  
7 As observed by Beazley P, this statement has been endorsed in subsequent decision-making, including the decision of 
Secretary, Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s case) [1992] HCA 15 (Brennan J, at 280). 
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applicants’ submissions are best understood as imposing a limit on the power to grant relief if a particular 
finding is made, rather than the imposition of a limitation on the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
 His Honour further observed that once this is accepted, “it is consistent with the flexibility 
inherent in that approach that it should provide a basis for a court to mould orders to the specific 
circumstances of the case, rather than impose a categorical restriction on the availability of relief” (at 
[46]). 
THE RELEVANCE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF 
URGENT MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The applicants also sought to argue that the scope of s 174 of the Children and Young Persons (Care 
and Protection) Act 1988 (NSW) was relevant to the court’s determination. This legislative provision 
provides protection to medical practitioners who give emergency or urgent medical treatment in 
circumstances where such treatment is necessary to save the life of a minor, when consent is not 
obtained. In such circumstances, the legislation provides that any medical treatment given should be 
deemed to have been carried out with the consent of the minor’s parents, or consent from the “young 
person” (a young person is defined as aged 16- to 18-years-old in the legislation). The applicants 
submitted that in cases where such urgent treatment is required to save the life of the minor or to 
prevent serious damage to his or her health, there is no requirement to obtain court authority. They 
further argued that because this is so, it would be inconsistent “to permit the Court to deny authority 
to the young person to consent in circumstances where consent was available and had been given or 
withheld” (at [48]). 
 In response to this submission, the court noted that the statutory provision relied upon by the 
applicants was silent concerning the issue of whether minors are able to refuse to consent to treatment 
that is deemed necessary for the preservation of life or the deterioration of health. It was also 
observed that the provision failed to address the orders that can be made by the court within the scope 
of the parens patriae jurisdiction in this respect (at [50]). Importantly, Basten JA also observed that 
although it has been noted in other decisions that there is no reason in logic to distinguish between an 
ability to consent to treatment, and an ability to refuse treatment, the consequences of such a decision 
are not identical (at [66]): 
 
a statute which confers immunity from suit in circumstances where a young person has consented, may not 
confer immunity from suit with respect to a failure to treat, where the young person withheld consent. The 
parens patriae jurisdiction is not limited to cases of refusal of medically recommended treatment; questions 
also arise where the child or young person wishes to have treatment about which there is doubt as to 
whether it is in his or her best interests.  
 
 Consequently, the court rejected the submissions on this point and declined to find that the statute 
provides a basis upon which a mature minor can lawfully reject medical treatment that is needed to 
save life or prevent the deterioration of health. 
ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
In addition to clarifying the scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction, the judgment also outlined a 
number of further points of importance. This decision makes clear that in circumstances where the 
parens patriae jurisdiction is invoked, the court’s primary consideration is to make an assessment of 
the welfare of the minor. This is the guiding principle for decision-making by the court, even in cases 
where the minor is very close to reaching the age of majority.  
 In addition to the submissions concerning the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, it was argued that 
the judge at first instance failed to pay due regard to a number of factors when arriving at a decision. 
These factors included, inter alia, the minor’s right to make an autonomous decision (including the 
right to determine what is in his own best interests), the minor’s religious beliefs, and the fact that the 
minor was very close to reaching the age of majority (at [51]).  
 Basten JA emphasised that the court must make an independent assessment of the minor’s 
welfare and that the balance will normally tilt towards the preservation of life. It was observed that 
“the ‘dignity of the individual’ is as much an aspect of the broader interests to be protected by the 
court as is the ‘sanctity of life’” (at [57]). However, Basten JA further noted that these fundamental 
principles were to be weighed up, not in the context of the broader public interest, but instead “in 
their application to an individual” (at [57]).  
 Basten JA also observed that the principles of autonomy and the sanctity of life were in direct 
conflict with each other in the case, and that the “interest of the state in preserving life is at its highest 
with respect to children and young persons who are inherently vulnerable, in varying degrees” (at 
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[60]). It is this notion of vulnerability which, it was observed, “lies at the heart of the disability 
identified by legal incapacity” (at [60]). This is particularly so in cases where the minor’s decision 
(and/or the parents’ decision) conflicts with the views of other carers, which in this case included the 
clinicians caring for the applicant (at [61]). The significance of the fact that the applicant was fast 
approaching the age of majority also seems to be of no great significance to the court’s assessment. 
Basten JA observed that (at [72]): 
 
there is no reason why a different result should be achieved because the applicant is now five months closer 
to his 18th birthday. The interest of the state is in keeping him alive until that time, after which he will be 
free to make his own decisions as to medical treatment. 
 
 Although the applicant’s desire to refuse the administration of blood products was not respected, 
the decision also makes clear that his wishes were not completely irrelevant to the court’s assessment. 
Thus, it was stated that the welfare assessment is dependent upon the range of different factors 
relevant to the particular case and that this did not simply involve allowing the most medically 
appropriate course of treatment (at [63]): 
 
In considering the exercise of the power, the motivation underlying the decision of the applicants is by no 
means irrelevant and does not become so because it is not based on an assessment of the medical treatment 
in isolation. Nor is the appropriateness of an order to be judged solely according to the view the court forms 
as to the best medical treatment. 
 
 Lastly, the court also considered the relevance of the applicant’s religious beliefs. Beazley P 
noted that although the “religious beliefs of a particular section or group within society are not to be 
discounted” even when such beliefs are not held by the broader community, “the respect to be given 
to the particular religious beliefs of an individual is not the Court’s only consideration” (at [6]). 
Furthermore, Basten JA observed that although an individual’s religious beliefs form a fundamental 
aspect of an individual’s autonomy “with which the state cannot interfere and should not disregard”, 
such beliefs are not determinative to the welfare assessment (at [64]). 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, this recent decision reiterates that the fundamental principle of relevance in cases 
concerning the refusal of life-saving medical treatment by mature minors is that of “best interests”. 
When the parens patriae jurisdiction is invoked for the protection of a mature minor, the concept of 
autonomy is therefore only relevant when considering how the exercise of such autonomy accords 
with the minor’s welfare, from an independent point of view. Thus, when the parens patriae 
jurisdiction is invoked, a Gillick competent minor has no “right” to refuse life-saving medical 
treatment where the provision or continuation of treatment is deemed to be in that individual’s best 
interests. Similarly, the case confirms that the principle of the sanctity of life is likely to nearly always 
outweigh the concept of autonomy in cases involving minors. Even in cases where the minor in 
question is nearing the age of majority, this fact seems to be of little relevance, as the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court is to prioritise the individual’s welfare until he or she reaches the age of 
majority. Finally, although religious beliefs also appear to be relevant to the range of factors that a 
court will consider when evaluating the minor’s best interests, they will not be determinative if 
reliance on such beliefs leads to an outcome that is contrary to the minor’s welfare interests. 
Dr Malcolm K Smith 
 
 
